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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shayne Ray Burgess appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of aggravated assault on certain law enforcement 
personnel, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the aggravated assault, 
and resisting, delaying or obstructing an officer. On appeal, Burgess challenges 
two of the court's evidentiary rulings. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In an attempt to commit "suicide by cop," Burgess swung a knife at a 
police officer who was attempting to detain him during a traffic stop. (11/20/13 
Tr., p.168, L.5-p.197, L.19, p.200, Ls.8-19; 11/21/13Tr., p.11, L.15-p.14, L.2, 
p.15, Ls.3-21, p.45, L.14 - p.47, L.9, p.51, L.4 - p.52, L.20, p.53, L.6 - p.54, 
L.12, p.59, L.10 - p.60, L.11, p.70, L.11 - p.71, L.3, p.77, L.4 - p.80, L.12, p.94, 
Ls.1-15, p.100, L.13-p.102, L.5, p.131, L.19-p.132, L.13, p.134, L.22-p.144, 
L.23.) The state charged Burgess with aggravated assault on certain law 
enforcement personnel, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the 
aggravated assault, and resisting and obstructing an officer. (R., pp.46-47.) 
After a trial, a jury found Burgess guilty of the charged offenses. (R., pp.120-23.) 
The district court entered a judgment of conviction, from which Burgess timely 
appealed. (R., pp.137-42, 144-47.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Burgess states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in [sic] when it allowed the State to 
introduce on cross-examination Mr. Burgess's inculpatory 
statements that were obtained in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona? 
2. Did the district court err when it admitted Mr. Burgess's 
statement that he used methamphetamine on the day of the 
offense? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Burgess failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
allowing the state to cross-examine him regarding un-Mirandized 
statements he made to police where Burgess never moved before trial to 
suppress the statements on the ground that they were involuntary or 
otherwise unlawfully obtained? 
2. Has Burgess failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
allowing the state to cross-examine Burgess regarding his 
methamphetamine use on the day of the charged events, where such 




Burgess Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing 
The State To Cross-Examine Him Regarding Un-Mirandized Statements He 
Never Moved Before Trial To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
After he was taken into custody, Burgess made the following statements 
to the police officer who transported him from the scene of the traffic stop to the 
hospital: 
• "You guys aren't going to try and charge me with assault on an officer 
because I was trying to die, not hurt anybody[;]" and 
• "[l]t's still going to come out with assault with a weapon or some shit like 
that[.]" 
(11/22/13 Tr., p.245, L.8 - p.246, L.12.) The prosecutor did not present 
evidence of these statements during the state's case-in-chief. However, after 
Burgess' counsel indicated Burgess would testify, the prosecutor sought leave to 
cross-examine Burgess regarding the statements, explaining: 
Those comments Mr. Burgess makes to Trooper Robinson, I did 
not attemft to admit in my case-in-chief because there is no 
Miranda. 11 I didn't want to get into that issue. He's in the back of 
[the] car on the way to the hospital. But there has been no claim 
that those are involuntary. So I think it is permissible for me to 
cross-examine Mr. Burgess on any statements he made to Trooper 
Robinson, but I don't want to do that without clarifying that. 
(11/22/13 Tr., p.227, Ls.11-20.) Burgess objected to the prosecutor's request, 
arguing: 
Well, Judge, he's clearly in custody. So I think it's inherently 
at some level of coercion. It is an answer to - there is conversation 
initiated by Trooper Robinson. 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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So we would ask that those statements not be admissible. 
It's clearly before any Miranda warnings also. 
(11/22/13 Tr., p.227, L.22 - p.228, L.3.) The trial court overruled Burgess' 
objection and allowed the prosecutor to question Burgess about the un-
Mirandized statements on cross-examination. (11/22/13 Tr., p.228, Ls.4-5, 
p.245, L.8 - p.246, L.16.) 
On appeal Burgess argues "it was error for the district court to allow the 
State, on cross-examination, to introduce his inculpatory statements to Trooper 
Robinson" because "[t]he statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona, and the State did not meet its burden of showing that the statements 
were voluntary and that they were being offered for a permissible purpose." 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) Burgess' argument fails. Burgess never moved before 
trial to exclude the statements on the basis that they were involuntary or 
otherwise unlawfully obtained. Having failed to file a timely motion to suppress 
the statements, Burgess waived the right to challenge their admissibility at trial. 
Burgess has therefore failed to show the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing the prosecutor to introduce the statements during its cross-examination. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520,521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). 
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C. The Trial Court Correctly Exercised Its Discretion In Allowing The State To 
Introduce On Cross-Examination Un-Mirandized Statements Burgess 
Made To Police And Never Moved Before Trial To Suppress 
Burgess never moved before trial to suppress the statements he made to 
Trooper Robinson while be transported to the hospital. (See generally R., pp.2-6 
(register of actions).) Nevertheless, when the prosecutor sought to introduce 
those statements on cross-examination, Burgess objected on the bases that the 
statements were "coerc[ed]" and made without the benefit of Miranda warnings. 
(11/22/13 Tr., p.227, L.22 - p.228, L.3.) The trial court overruled Burgess' 
objection and permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine Burgess regarding the 
statements. (11/22/13 Tr., pp.228, Ls.4-5.) Contrary to Burgess' argument on 
appeal, the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in admitting the 
statements over Burgess' objection, made for the first time at trial, that the 
statements were involuntary. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b) provides that "[m]otions to suppress evidence 
on the ground that it was illegally obtained" "must be raised prior to trial." I.C.R. 
12(b)(3); State v. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 912, 539 P.2d 263, 265 (1975); 
State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 590, 944 P.2d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 1997). 
"Failure to make such a motion prior to trial "shall constitute a waiver thereof, but 
the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver." I.C.R. 12(f); 
Collinsworth, 96 Idaho at 912, 539 P.2d at 265; Gleason, 130 Idaho at 590, 944 
P.2d at 725. ''The purpose of such a rule is to avoid 'the serious inconvenience 
to jurors from unnecessary disruptions of trial to deal with issues that could and 
should have been raised in advance."' Collinsworth, 96 Idaho at 913, 539 P.2d 
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at 266 (citing United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 901 (2d Cir. 1969); 3 
Wright & Miller, Criminal § 673, p.115 (1969)). Where a defendant fails to timely 
file a motion to suppress evidence he or she claims was unlawfully obtained, and 
where the defendant offers no reason why such motion could not have been 
made prior to trial, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by admitting the 
evidence at trial. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho at 912-13, 539 P.2d at 265-66; 
Gleason, 130 Idaho at 590-91, 944 P.2d at 725-26. 
Burgess never moved before trial to suppress the statements he made to 
Trooper Robinson (see generally R., pp.2-6 (register of actions)), and he offered 
no reason at all why such a motion could not have been made prior to trial (see 
Tr., p.227, L.10 - p.228, L.5). Having failed to file a timely motion to suppress, 
and having failed to even attempt to demonstrate good cause excusing such 
failure, Burgess waived the right to challenge the admissibility of his statements 
on the basis that statements were unlawfully obtained. I.C.R. 12(b)(3), (f); 
Collinsworth, 96 Idaho at 912-13, 539 P.2d at 265-66; Gleason, 130 Idaho at 
590-91, 944 P.2d at 725-26. He has therefore failed to establish that the district 
court abused its discretion in admitting the statements at trial. 
11. 
Burgess Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence That He Used 
Methamphetamine On The Day Of The Charged Offenses 
A. Introduction 
While being treated at the hospital following the events that led to the 
charges in this case, Burgess told the treating physician that he had "injected 
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methamphetamine earlier in the day." (11/23/13 Tr., p.224, L.10 - p.225, L.10.) 
Burgess moved to exclude the statement from trial, arguing evidence of his 
methamphetamine use on the day of the charged events was "more prejudicial 
than probative." (11/23/13 Tr., p.224, Ls.10-16, p.225, Ls.16-17.) The trial court 
denied the motion, effectively agreeing with the prosecutor's argument that 
Burgess' methamphetamine use was relevant to his credibility because it had the 
"capacity" to affect Burgess' ability to perceive and recall events, and implicitly 
concluding that the probative value of the evidence for that purpose was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (11/23/13 Tr., p.225, 
L.19 - p.226, L.15) Contrary to Burgess' assertions on appeal, a review of the 
record and of the applicable law supports the trial court's exercise of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520,521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). 
C. Burgess Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Determining The Probative Value Of Evidence Of Burgess' 
Methamphetamine Use On The Day Of The Charged Offenses Was Not 
Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice 
Pursuant to I.RE. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice - which is the tendency 
to suggest a decision on an improper basis - substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 
720, 722 (201 O); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. 
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App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 
1993). "Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a 
strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence." State v. Martin, 118 
Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original). 
Application of these legal principles to the facts of this case supports the 
district court's decision to admit evidence of Burgess' methamphetamine use on 
the day of the charged events over Burgess' general objection that such 
evidence was "more prejudicial than probative." (11/22/13 Tr., p.225, Ls.16-17.) 
As argued by the state below, and found by the district court, evidence that 
Burgess injected methamphetamine on the same day he was alleged to have 
committed the charged crimes was relevant to Burgess' ability to perceive and 
recall the events of that day. (11/22/13 Tr., p.225, L.19 - p.226, L.2, p.226, Ls.8-
14.) Because Burgess testified to the events as he perceived them, his 
methamphetamine use on the day in question bore directly on the accuracy and 
truthfulness of his testimony. See State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 909, 478 P.2d 
284, 289 (1970) ("A witness's ability to perceive bears a direct relationship to the 
accuracy and truthfulness of his testimony."). While it may be true, as Burgess 
suggests on appeal, that methamphetamine use carries with it a "significant 
social stigma" (Appellant's brief, p.10), any danger that the jury may have 
considered the evidence for an improper purpose - such as painting Burgess as 
a drug user - did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence 
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as bearing on Burgess' credibility. This is especially true considering the 
prosecutor's closing remarks to the jury: 
¾ 
The only reason we talk about his admission to the use of 
methamphetamine is it may - you may decide that that has some 
bearing or whether Mr. Burgess's recollection of these events is 
entirely accurate. We are not here to say that - we're not here to 
pass judgment on who he is as a person. You are to decide what 
he did. What he did is he wanted to die rather than go to jail. And 
he was willing to lunge at Officer Bateman to make that happen. 
(11/22/13 Tr., p.303, Ls.3-12.) 
"A witness's credibility is always relevant." State v. Osterhoudt, 155 Idaho 
867, 874 P.3d 636, 643 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 
503, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999); State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 808 
P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ct. App. 1991)). Because evidence of Burgess' 
methamphetamine use bore directly on his credibility, and because there is no 
indication that the jury considered the evidence for anything other than its proper 




The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding Burgess guilty of aggravated assault on certain law 
enforcement personnel, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the 
aggravated assault, and resisting and obstructing an officer. 
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2015. 
I A FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney Gener 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21 st day of January, 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
LAF/pm 
I A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney Gene 
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